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MODERN CHIVALRY, the first distinctively American novel, was 
written in instalments in 1792-18151 by Hugh Henry Brackenridge, 
Princeton graduate and frontier lawyer.2 In addition to providing 
extensive commentary on the political differences of the Jeffersonians 
and Hamiltonians, the novel attempted to establish an apolitical 
value system for the new democracy which was based on philosophical 
reflection rather than existing social precedence. Brackenridge's con-
cern with independent thinking in Modern Chivalry foreshadows the 
themes of artistic isolation, subjectivity, and alienation which pre-
occupy many nineteenth- and twentieth-century American novelists. 
Brackenridge is the first American novelist to focus on the theme of 
the alienated artist in a democracy. The problem of artistic self-
definition in a society which denies the value of art can be better 
understood in the context of the efforts of Captain Farrago, the 
protagonist of Modern Chivalry, to survive the levelling influence of 
the mob and to counteract the confused values of the new democracy. 
Farrago, unable to accept the emphasis on profit and the materialistic 
definition of success in post-Revolutionary America, becomes a 
pioneer on the psychological frontier, and he is the first fictional 
protagonist in a long list of solitary figures who appear in later novels. 
1 Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Modern Chivalry, ed. Claude M. Newlin (New York: 
Hafner Publishing Company, 1937). All quotations from Modern Chivalry will be taken 
from Newlin's edition and cited by page number only in the text. 
2 See Claude M. Newlin, The Life and Writings of Hugh Henry Brackenridge (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1932), for a detailed biography of Brackenridge 
1748-1816. Newlin discusses at great length Brackenridge's undergraduate days at 
Princeton, his law practice in Pittsburgh, his experience as a journalist with the United 
States Magazine, and his political troubles resulting from his effort to mediate between 
local and federal interests during the Whiskey Insurrection in Pittsburgh in 1794. 
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Like Captain Farrago, Natty Bumpo, Huck Finn, Ishmael, Miles 
Coverdale, Nick Carraway, Nick Adams, Augie March, Joe Christ-
mas, and Stephen Rojack, are not merely eccentric bachelors but 
marginal men who must establish value systems on the basis of their 
own experience. Leslie Fiedler in his essay "Come Back to the Raft, 
Huck Honey," in Love and Death in the American Novel, observes 
that the American fictional hero is often single and implies that his 
marital status casts doubts on his heterosexuality. However, the fact 
that the American protagonist isn't married has little to do with his 
sexual predilections; rather it reflects his insistence on being free of 
social institutions like marriage which pre-structure his experience. 
In part, the tradition of the solitary, introspective author stems from 
the Puritan habit of self-scrutiny in an effort to detect sin and discern 
God's message. That the Puritan legacy of self-scrutiny has had such 
a major impact on the American mind is demonstrated by the immense 
contemporary popularity of psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, and other 
therapies based on self-analysis and by the interesting anomaly that 
the work of Freud, a nineteenth-century European intellectual, 
satisfies American needs for self-analysis while being of much less 
importance to European thought in general. Puritan introspection is 
reflected in Brackenridge's insistence that "the man of real genius 
will never walk in the beaten track, because his object is what is new 
and uncommon" (11-12). Brackenridge warns his readers, however, 
that "it requires great courage to bear testimony against an error in the 
judgment of the multitude" (382) and that "the man is a hero, who 
can withstand unjust opinion. It requires more courage, than to fight 
duels" (412).3 As a result of having to develop the habit of psycho-
logical self-reliance as an adaptive response to social rejection, 
Brackenridge's protagonist Captain Farrago learns that he must 
develop a sense of self that does not depend on community approval, 
social ritual or categories: 
I have been called the Knight of the single Horse, having but one myself, 
and none for my attendant; in this particular unlike my predecessors, 
whose squires were mounted as well as themselves. In some places I have 
taken my designation from the Irish valet that I had, and of whom you have 
heard me speak, of the name of Teague, and have been called the Owner of 
the red-headed Bogtrotter; as it is probable I may now be designated 
3 Brackenridge himself was a marginal man and learned the importance of self-
reliance while he was a lawyer in Pittsburgh at a time when law was an extremely unpopular 
profession, and again when he was defeated as a candidate for Congress. See Newlin, 
The Life and Writings, pp. 71-87, 241-251. 
BRACKENRIDGE'S MODERN CHIVALRY 243 
occasionally by the appellation of the Master of the raw Scotchman, ... but 
all these things I look upon as inconsiderable. It is of little, or perhaps 
of no consequence to me, what my stile is amongst men; provided it contains 
nothing in it that may impeach my moral character .... They may call me 
Don Quixotte, or Hudibras, or the Knight of Blue Beard, or the Long 
Nose, or what they please. It is all the same to me (256-257). 
Because Farrago realizes that social labels do not reflect his indivi-
duality, his sense of self is not dependent on social approbation but 
rather on an awareness of his own uniqueness and conviction of the 
validity of his personal moral code. Although Brackenridge counsels 
intellectual and social independence, he realizes that some men prefer 
to be enslaved rather than to experience the uncertainty that accom-
panies freedom from social rituals: 
but if you examine the capacities, and even the inclinations of men, will you 
not find, that some are qualified only to be slaves? They have not the 
understanding to act for themselves. Nor do all love freedom, even when 
they have it. Do not many surrender it; and prefer kissing a great man's 
backside, to being independent? It is not always, even from the views of 
advantage, that men are sycophants; but from an abstract pleasure in being 
drawn into vortex of others. There is a pleasure in slavery more than 
unenslaved men know (136). 
This habit of psychological self-reliance creates a sensitivity to the 
difference between the individual's perceptions and social forms 
which pre-structure these perceptions. It is this preoccupation with 
subjective truth and the consequent sense of isolation which many 
critics maintain characterizes the American novel; however, no critic 
discusses these characteristics as being the special problems of the 
novelist in a democracy. Richard Chase, in The American Novel and 
Its Tradition, asserts that "The American imagination ... seems less 
interested in incarnation and reconciliation than in alienation and 
disorder" (11), and "solipsism, Hypnotic self-regard, imprisonment 
within the self-these themes have absorbed American novelists" 
(107); Chase differentiates between the novel and the romance on the 
basis that "in a romance much may be made out of unrelatedness, of 
alienation, and discontinuity, for the romancer operates in a universe 
that is less coherent than that of the novelist" (22), but he fails to 
observe that the romance is narrative of the isolated self in a democracy. 
Leon Howard, in Literature and the American Tradition, traces the 
habit of psychological self-reliance from Samuel Johnson who 
"developed the Platonic notion which was implicit in Ramean logic, 
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and asserted a kind of intellectual light within us" (50-51). However, 
like Chase, Howard does not attempt to analyze the individualism 
and subjectivity of the late nineteenth and twentieth century as being 
related to the isolation of the artist in a democracy-a tradition which 
Brackenridge articulates in the eighteenth century: 
This new [italics mine] individualism, however, was different from that of 
the mid-nineteenth century. For with James and his successors a new 
consciousness became evident in American literature-a pervading aware-
ness of the conflict between the individual and society. Man was no longer 
free, as he had been in the mind of Emerson, to vault into his throne and 
lord it over the creepers and crawlers of the conventional world. He had 
to assert his individuality, by self-sacrifice, by isolation, by flamboyant 
rebellion, or by a parade of eccentricity, in order to be sure that he main-
tained it. The weight of a complex social organization was depressing the 
confidence of even those who were most determined to declare their 
independence, and it remained to be seen whether the American tradition 
would survive as a deep quality of belief or whether it would remain as no 
more tlian a symbolic refuge of the maladjustments of second-rate talent 
(246). 
Finally, R. W. B. Lewis, in The American Adam: Innocence, Tragedy 
and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century, discusses the plight of the 
American hero in terms of his innocence and lack of experience: not 
only does Lewis ignore the tradition of man's frailty established by 
both Puritans and the Enlightenment, but he ignores the special 
complications for the artist inherent in democracy as a social system.4 
As Brackenridge observes the disparity between his version of 
reality and social versions, he becomes aware of the subjective nature 
of his experience and the relativity of his point of view-an awareness 
which is reflected in both the narrative technique and form of Modern 
Chivalry. The narrator of the novel is a detached observer who evalu-
ates and discourses at length on the significance of the adventures of 
the philosopher and profiteer on the road; he is intellectually superior 
to Captain Farrago, who is depicted as being virtuous but often naive: 
"John Farrago, a man of about fifty-three years of age, of good natural 
sense, and considerable reading; but in some things whimsical, owing 
perhaps to his greater knowledge of books than that of the world" (6). 
The narrator, more knowledgeable and worldly than Farrago, often 
assumes a protective role toward the quixotic philosopher, and since 
4 See Richard Chase, The American Novel and Its Tradition (New York: Doubleday, 
1957); Leon Howard, Literature and the American Tradition (New York: Doubleday, 
1960); and R. W. B. Lewis, The American Adam: Innocence, Tragedy and Tradition in 
the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965). 
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his ego is not directly affected by the events of the journey, he is freer to 
reflect at length on the significance of Farrago's experiences. The 
narrator elucidates the meaning of Farrago's travels, which, in part, 
can be seen as a secular extension of the Puritan journey in which the 
voyager must endure trials from within and without: since the narrator 
is once removed from the action of the novel, like the Puritan preacher, 
he is able to play the role of penetrating social critic who provides 
deeper insights into the significance of the social drama in which 
Farrago and Teague are actors. At the same time, the perspective of 
the novel serves to heighten the reader's awareness of the subjective 
nature of reality as it becomes clear that the narrator, Farrago, and 
O'Reagan are each focusing on somewhat different worlds-the 
narrator is concerned with human values which transcend socio-
cultural variables, Farrago with virtue in a democratic political system, 
and Teague with profit in a capitalistic economy and status in an 
upwardly mobile society. 
The literary significance of the frontier is also clarified when evalu-
ated in terms of the possibilities it offers for self-definition by freeing 
the individual from confining social roles.5 Brackenridge embodies 
the frontier ideals of getting back to essentials and psychological 
self-reliance in the character of the Marquis de Marnessie, a French 
emigrant who rids himself of a title-a comfortable social category-
and returns to a more basic life-style: 
... having cleared a small spot, [he] had made a garden and cultivated what 
is called a patch of Indian corn, subsisting and amusing himself and his 
family, chiefly by trapping and hunting in the neighbouring mountain .... 
His cabbin [sic] was neat and clean, with flooring of split timber, and stools 
made out of hewn logs. A few books, and a half a dozen small paintings, a 
fuzee, and an old sword being the only ornament of its walls (310). 
Thus, the frontier by freeing the individual from the elaborate social 
and economic patterns of the city or town enables him to get closer to 
the core of human experience. 
Brackenridge's preoccupation with human values which transcend 
pragmatic imperatives and which are concerned with subjective 
experience rather than excessively stylized social interaction or entre-
preneural activities, explains why in Modern Chivalry there is no 
5 Henry Nash Smith, in his classic study of the literary significance of the frontier, 
The Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth (New York: Random House, 
Inc., 1950), discusses the political and economic implications of the frontier in shaping 
the American character, but he does not discuss the frontier as providing the opportunity 
for psychological self-reliance or as a refuge for the artist. 
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description of physical environment-landscape or buildings-or 
financial transactions and why there are almost no details of clothing 
or material goods. Instead, the novel concentrates on the narrator's 
response to the experiences of the social philosopher and the profiteer 
as they explore life in the new nation. The narrator's alienation is 
clearly revealed: 
Why is it that I am proud and value myself amongst my own species? It is 
because I think I possess, in some degree, the distinguishing characteristic 
of a man, a taste for the fine arts; a taste and characteristic too little valued 
in America, where a system of finance has introduced the love of unequal 
wealth; destroyed the spirit of common industry; and planted that oflottery 
in the human heart; making the mass of people gamblers; and under the 
idea of speculation, shrouded engrossing and monopoly everywhere (281). 
Thus, the divergence in world-views of Farrago, the philosopher, and 
Teague, the profiteer, is reinforced by the economic structure of 
capitalism. Max Weber and Emile Durkheim argue that the division 
of labor creates multiple realities often resulting in social dislocation 
of the individual, which is experienced as solitude or anomie depending 
on the degree of alienation,6 and while the existence of multiple 
realities helps the con man to conceal his trickery, it causes the 
American writer to feel all the more alienated.7 
In addition to the tensions created by a democratic social structure 
and a capitalistic economic system, the distinction between matter 
and mind, subject and object, which separates the knower from the 
known, manifests itself in the eighteenth century in Lockean asso-
ciationism, an approach to perception based on the conviction that 
reason is simply an arranger of experienceS-that there are no a priori 
6 See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirito/Capitalism, translated by Talcott 
Parsons (London, 1930); Emile Durkheim, Division 0/ Labor in Society, translated by 
George Simpson (New York: Free Press, 1947). 
Ian Watt in The Rise o/the Novel: Studies in De/oe, Richardson, and Fielding (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1959), argues that economic specialization created by 
capitalism resulted in an emphasis on the individual (61), and that the concomitant to 
economic individualism was solitude (86-92). However, Watt doesn't discuss the multiple 
realities created by capitalism nor the effects of solitude on point of view in the novel. 
7 Helene S. Zahler, The American Paradox (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 
1964), pp. 108-109, comments on economic structure in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century 
As an increasingly complex economy needed and attracted a new kind of working force, so it gave rise to 
new groups of the dispossessed and thus generated alienation more like the modem kind than the isolation 
experienced by colonial intellectuals. The newly alienated fall into tbree categories: the traditional artisan; 
the artist; and the intellectual, often the educated son of an established family, whose place in the esteem 
of the community was being taken by men more successful in making money. 
S Perry Miller, The Life 0/ the Mind in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1965), p. 84, points out that the heritage 
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principles for structuring experience.9 David Hwne in his Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding elaborates the phenomenon of 
associationism: "the creative power of the mind amounts to no more 
than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or 
diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience."IO 
Thus, experience becomes process, knowledge and reality subjective 
states of mind. The loose structure of Modern Chivalry reflects this 
shift from experience as product to experience as process,l1 and the 
open form of the novel captures the fluidity of associative subjective 
experience, as does the language which Brackenridge says is modeled 
on Hwne's Religion of Nature (630), "rising and falling with subject, 
as the movements of the mind themselves" (78). The novel does not 
conclude with a scene which resolves all of the tensions in the plot; 
instead it ends as it began, with Teague still successfully conning the 
of the Enlightenment is that reason "gives no laws of itself" but is an organizer of facts 
and ideas. 
9 Charles Feidelson in Symbolism in American Literature (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1953), argues that the logical methodology which the Puritans derived 
from Ramus is responsible for the subject/object dichotomy in American thinking: 
The logical methodology which the Puritans derived from Ramus mapped out a world of discrete entities-
"arguments." ••• Every disciple could be scbematized by a succession of dichotomies so as to distinguish 
and put in their places the arguments of which it was composed. The syllogism was of minor importance 
beside this method of dichotomizing •••• the Ramistic logic was more than a mechanically divisive system; 
but its practical effect was to convert the universe into an assemblage of logical counters, a mechanical 
framework of causes and effects, "subjects" and "adjuncts" whose "either·or" relationship was dramatized 
by the elementary principle of dichotomy (87). 
According to Feidelson, 
The intellectual stance of the conscious artist in American literature has been determined very largely by 
problems inherent in the method of the Puritans. The isolation of the American artist in society, so often 
lamented, is actually parallel to the furtive and unacknowledged role of artistic method in the American mind; 
both factors began in the seventeenth century with the establishment of Puritan philosophy and of a society 
that tried to live by it (89). 
Feidelson also points out that 
by 1800 the philosophy taught in American colleges was almost entirely Lockean, and the political, social, 
and economic life of the New World was an embodiment of the New Learning (107). 
Thus, Cartesian dualism combined with the already established habit of either/or thinking 
to further separate the individual from his world: 
Cartesian dualism had made the world safe for science by creating separate repositories, called "matter" 
and "mind." ••• Empirical theory held that the given materials of knowledge are atomistic sensations, 
passively received and variously combined by the intellect, so that the fullness of subjective life becomes 
unreal (110). 
10 David Hume, Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning 
Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1902), p. 19. 
11 Northrop Frye, "Towards Defining an Age of Sensibility," Fables of Identity: 
Studies in Poetic Mythology (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963), pp. 130-138, 
discusses the shift from product to process in the eighteenth century, and although he 
considers the effect of this shift on such novelists as Sterne, he says nothing of the effect 
of process-oriented experience on the form of the novel in general. Similarly, M. H. 
Abrams in The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1953), discusses the emergence of the associative imagina-
tion as characterizing Romanticism (177), but, like Frye, he does not discuss the implica-
tions of this change for the form of the novel. 
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public and Farrago still wandering around the countryside-hence, 
the conclusion creates no artificial break with reality but presents life 
as an unbroken process. 
Brackenridge's concern with sUbjective experience is also reflected 
in the many digressions and the didactic commentary interwoven with 
the chapters which narrate the adventures of the philosopher and the 
profiteer; although critics have insisted that these discursive sections 
make the novel excessively repetitive and rambling, the digressions 
and didactic sections, which Brackenridge says are modeled on Xeno-
phon, Swift's Tale of a Tub, Gulliver's Travels, Tacitus (77), permit 
him to explore and elaborate at length his version of reality, while at 
the same time surveying the political, social, and economic values of 
the new democracy. Brackenridge attributes the digressions to "a 
mUltiplicity of ideas at one cause. They are numerous and press for 
utterance; and when a certain set have had an outlet in part, the speaker 
suspends awhile the prosecuting them, and goes back to fetch others. 
It would be like Charon in his boat upon the river Styx, were there an 
island in it, ferrying a number of shades halfway; leaving them on the 
island, and going back to bring others that distance, who are crowding 
on the shore, and anxious to cross. Or like a mechanic, that has a 
great number of customers, and cannot satisfy, but by beginning the 
work in general, and carrying it on by pieces; having it in his power to 
say to all that their work is on hands" (655). 
While the entrepreneur perceives his world in terms of profit and 
losses, the independent thinker is free to explore many versions of 
reality because he is not bound by pragmatic imperatives. As Modern 
Chivalry progresses, Brackenridge develops a growing sense of cultural 
relativity: the first two books of Modern Chivalry concentrate on the 
detection of Teague's plots and the training of Teague to be president; 
the subsequent books not only survey the new democracy in an 
attempt to determine national values, but also reveal a contempt for 
ethnocentricity which limits the horizon of the new nation to the profit 
motive. For example, in rebuking an arrogant British inn-keeper for 
his excessive chauvinism, Farrago says, 
I wonder if the wasps that are in your garrets in London, consider themselves 
better than the wasps that are in these woods? I should suppose they must; 
such is the contemptible vanity of an island, which, taken in its whole 
extent, would be little more than a urinal to one of our Patagonians in 
South America (89). 
Again, the dislike of confining cultural habits is revealed when 
Farrago calms Duncan, the superstitious Scottish servant who has 
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temporarily replaced Teague: "It is the prejudice of your education, 
to suppose that the devil can take the shape of men, or tangible 
substance; at least that he can eat food, and converse with a human 
voice. You will come by and bye to have a better sense of things" 
(263). Opposing sets of values are held by Teague who creates false 
confidence in his audience and by Duncan who is continually vic-
timized by con men: ironically, Duncan is willing to suffer the con-
siderable inconvenience of staying awake all night to guard against 
devils who he thinks lurk outside, thereby defending his version of 
reality (265-266). As Farrago becomes aware of the fact that reality 
is consensus, or as the mad democrat says, "Behold, we are made to do 
that which is right in the eyes of others" (385), he wonders if the men in 
the insane asylum are "more devoid of reason than the bulk of men 
running at large in the world" (387). 
Madness, a major theme in Modern Chivalry, is often seen as 
sanity in a society where profit takes precedence over knowledge, an 
inversion of values which is reflected in the mad philosopher's lament: 
"Oh! the inconsistency of human life and manners. I am shut up 
here as a mad man, in a mad place, and yet it appears to me that I am 
the only rational being amongst men, because I know that I am mad, 
and acknowledge it, and they do not know that they are mad, or 
acknowledge it" (385). The madman asks the question that reveals 
he has more wisdom than those who judge him: "But how can one 
rebut the imputation of madness; how disprove insanity? The 
highest excellence of understanding, and madness, like the two ends 
of a right line, turned to a circle, are said to come together" (430). 
The following dialogue, patterned on the traditional reversal of roles 
in which the fool, or blind man, has more insight than his inquisitors, 
reveals Brackenridge's sympathy with the mad man rather than the 
mob: 
You are a man of books-
A little so. 
What books have you read? 
History, Divinity, Belles-lettres 






Of natural philosophy 
Doubt 
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What is the best lesson in moral philosophy? 
To expect no gratitude. 
What is the best qualification of a politician ? 
Honesty 
The next best? 
Knowledge 
The next best? 
Fortitude 
Who serves the people best? 
Not always him that pleases them most (431-432). 
The jury's verdict reveals the intolerance of the mob for divergent 
world-views: 
1. Juryman: he seems to be a little cracked. 
2. He does not appear to be right in his head. 
3. I cannot think him in his right mind. 
4. He is beside himself, doubtless. 
5. Crazy 




10. Stark mad 
11. As mad as a march hare 
12. Fit for Bedlam 
Verdict-Lunacy (431). 
Farrago himself prefers to be called mad than to accept the mob's 
version of reality (508): admonishing his accusers, "Gentlemen, there 
is now nothing more difficult for a man than to prove that he is not 
mad" (509), he goes into voluntary exile where, ironically, he finds men 
from Scotland and France who have likewise abandoned their coun-
tries rather than accept the mob's version of reality (510-514).12 
The materials added to M adern Chivalry in 1815 reveal that Bracken-
ridge extends his concept of the relativity of world-views to other 
12 Michel Foucault, in Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of 
Reason (New American Library, 1967) observes that our contemporary definition of 
insanity as an illness requiring institutionalization has emerged since the rise of empiricism 
in the late seventeenth century. In addition to pointing out that the insane have replaced 
lepers as social outcasts and scapegoats in modem society, Foucault suggests that present 
taboos surrounding insanity impoverish our cultural resources-that by ostracizing the 
insane, modem man denies himself access to psychic truths which enrich our understand-
ing of the human condition as well as our art. Similarly, G. S. Rousseau in his article 
"Science and the Discovery of the Imagination in Enlightened England," Eighteenth-
Century Studies, 3 (Fall 1969), 108-135, asserts that the eighteenth-century conviction 
that madness was the result of physiological rather than religious disorders, wrenches 
insanity "from the imaginary freedom which permitted it to flourish in the Renaissance 
when scientists could demonstrate that the body and mind worked. together in organic 
fashion" (119). 
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cultures, and his lengthy discussion about the relative merits of 
classical and European languages in which he presents his reasons for 
preferring Greek, indicates his ethnographic and comparative interests : 
"But of a111anguages that I have ever tasted, the Greek, unquestionably, 
with me has the preference to others. Bred in a soft air, and warm 
climate; whereas the English would seem to have been frozen in the 
North, before it began to be spoken by man; or rather it was first 
spoken by frozen men" (720-725). Just as he is depressed by the mob's 
tyrannical insistence in punishing the philosopher for not adhering to 
the social version of reality, so he is discouraged by the excessive 
ethnocentricity of his countrymen which prevents them from revering 
those values which will preserve civilization: 
Is there reason to suppose that this earth is, with respect to some superior 
order of beings, but a beehive; and that they are amused looking at our 
working? It is humiliating enough, to conceive so of our insignificance, 
and therefore I repel the idea; but supposing it be so, it must be amusing 
for them to see the same revolutions over again in the moral world. The 
like abstract notions in metaphysics, and theology, with similar experiments 
in government: For it is true what the philosopher observes, "there is 
nothing new under the sun" (727). 
The awareness of cultural relativity in Modern Chivalry is again 
seen in the Captain's expedition with the American Philosophical 
Society to an underground cave to examine artifacts of pre-European 
civilization such as Indian cave engravings of forest animals: 
Near the entrance, and on the right, was the passage to what is called the 
petrified grove. This, on their return they entered, and in about thirty 
steps found themselves in a spacious square, which appeared to have been 
once the surface of the earth: For here were trees in their natural position, 
with wasps nests on them, all petrified; and buffaloes standing under, in 
their proper form, but hard as adament. A bleak wind, with a petrifying 
dew, had arrested them in life, and fixed them to the spot; while the mountain 
in a series of ages had grown over them. That which struck the Captain most 
was an Indian man reduced to stone, with a bundle of peltry on his back 
(277). 
The cave contains buried realities of past civilizations existing on the 
very continent which was the site of the democratic experiment. This 
metaphor of the cave with its buried layer of civilization-one of the 
few metaphors in Modern Chivalry-also reveals Brackenridge's 
conviction that men must make a conscious and responsible effort to 
preserve civilization, or, like the cave which is in danger of being 
buried by mud, civilization will decay: 
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The mouth of the cave was of a height and width to receive a man walking 
upright, and without constraint, on his entrance; after a passage of a few 
yards, lined with solid rocks, it opened into an apartment of about eighteen 
feet cube. The oozing from above formed the stalactites, and would 
probably in the course of a century or two, fill up this chamber altogether, 
unless by digging above, the course of the water could be diverted from the 
roof, and carried off by a conduit on a solid part of the mountain (276). 
Although Brackenridge acknowledges the relativity of cultural 
values, he realizes that culture is a hedge against chaos and that 
institutional order is a shield against anxiety and anomic terror: 
culture provides a 
picture of human nature, from childhood to old age; from the baby-house 
to the laying out money in bank stock; or the purchasing land for which the 
owner has no occasion. It all goes to engage, and employ the mind, 
whether it is throwing a long bullet, or drawing up an address to the 
President of the United States. Our hands must be employed or our minds 
(756). 
However, in an effort to provide alternatives to the values of American 
culture which emphasize profit and social mobility, Brackenridge 
includes hundreds of quotations from classical literature and philo-
sophy in Modern Chivalry, in spite of the fact that he knows many of 
his readers will ignore them: "It is a strange contrast, that we admire 
learning in a pig, and undervalue it in a man" (419). In addition to the 
perspective provided by education, Brackenridge maintains that art 
shapes chaos, differentiating men from lower orders of life: 
I consider these sculptures, as the first rude essays of the fine art of engraving; 
and to have been the work of savages of taste, distinguished from the 
common mass, by a talent to imitate in wood or stone, the forms of things 
in nature, and a capacity of receiving pleasures from such an application 
of the mental powers. Whilst a chief of genius, was waiting for the assembl-
ing of other chiefs, to hold a council; or while the warrior was waiting at a 
certain point for others, that were to meet him, he may have amused himself 
in this manner; or it may have been the means to cheat weariness, and 
solace the intellectual faculty, when there was no counselling in the nation 
or wars to carryon. Happy savage, that could thus amuse himself and 
exercise his first preeminence over animals we call Beasts. They can hunt, 
and devour living things for food; but where do you find a wolf, or a 
fishing hawk, that has any idea of these abstract pleasures that feed the 
imagination? (280). 
Like the fine arts, written language is a measure of civilization: 
"Recte scribendi, sapere principium est, et fons. Good sense is the 
foundation of good writing" (475). Writing, like painting, is a culture-
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creating act; it is not simply utilitarian (480) but an antidote to 
intellectual pain (479): "There is a pleasure in writing, which only the 
man who writes knows" (492). Insisting that eloquence is "good 
sense expressed in clear language" (667), Brackenridge adheres to the 
Ciceronian concept of the tripartite function of rhetoric-to teach 
(docere), to persuade (mouere) and to delight (delectere).13 Although 
Brackenridge views language as a hallmark of the civilized man, he 
spurns verbal posturing as well as illiteracy: 
Language being the vestment of thought, it comes within the rules of other 
dress; so that as slovenliness, on the one hand, or foppery, on the other, is 
to be avoided in our attire; so also in our speech, and writing. Simplicity 
in the one and the other, is the greatest beauty (77).14 
Like the Puritans who used the plain style in order to reach the 
"meanest and lowest," congregation member Brackenridge attempts 
to reach the widest possible audience by using syntactically simple 
sentences, colloquial diction, while at the same time his prose is 
studded with allusions and quotations, and by adhering to common-
sense logic: 
It is the secret of good taste and perfection in behavior to conceal that you 
ever think at all. So it is the most perfect proof of a good style, that when 
you read the composition, you think of nothing but the sense; and are 
never struck with the idea that it is otherwise expressed than every body 
would express it (161). 
Brackenridge scorns verbal affectation and delights in deflating the 
egos of pompous individuals who conceal their lack of ability behind 
a screen of "officialese" or jargon: avoiding the pose of the erudite 
writer, Brackenridge shuns self-conscious stylistic elegance and writes 
simple, graceful prose; he uses Greek and Latin quotations and 
classical allusions not in a pedantic attempt to impress his audience 
13 See Cicero, De Oratore, Books I, II, trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham; Book III, 
trans. H. Rackham, 2 vols, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1942). Although 
Brackenridge read Qcero for pleasure, he also learned Ciceronian dictates from 
Witherspoon (see Newlin, Life and Writings of Hugh Henry Brackenridge, pp. 8-11), 
who taught them to his Princeton students via the Scottish Rhetoricians George Campbell, 
The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), and Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres 
(1783). See John Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1912), ed. Varnum Lansing CoIlins, introduction. 
14 Howard Mumford Jones, "American Prose Style: 1700-1770," Huntington Library 
Quarterly, 6 (November, 1934), pp. 115-151, argues that American prose style grows 
more plain and lucid from Mather's Magnalia Christi Americana in 1700 to Franklin's 
Autobiography in 1771. Brackenridge, like Franklin, writes lucid prose using Hume, 
Swift, and Fielding as his models: "And in the English Language, that of Hume, Swift, 
and Fielding, is the only stile that I have coveted to possess ... but the easy, the natural, 
and the graceful, is of all stiles, whether of manners or of speaking, the most difficult to 
attain" (643). 
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with his learning, but to illustrate his conviction that reason is constant 
in spite of socio-cultural variables. 
Brackenridge reminds his readers that clashing realities can result 
in violence and death unless laws are able to mediate the difference in 
conflicting world-views: Farrago as Governor of a frontier colony 
responds to a citizen who asks for "a bit of ground to set potatoes 
and to plant cabbage, with the free use of the shilelah into the bargain, 
as we had it in our country," in the following manner: 
That being the case, said the governor, the constitution that you have, will 
answer every purpose. It is for securing you in your possessions; and the 
free use of the shilelah subordinate to no law but that of the country, that 
the constitution has been framed. But for the constitution and the laws, 
what would you differ from the racoons and the opossums of the woods? 
It is this which makes all the difference that we shall find between man and 
beast (755). 
In order to avoid complications created by conflicting world-views, 
Brackenridge defers to the law as a means of establishing agreed-upon 
reality: 
Godwin, in his "Political Justice," with great brilliancy, supports the idea 
of deciding every case on its own peculiar circumstances, according to the 
notions of equity, which lie in the breast of the judge. This is what is done 
in Constantinople. But it is to avoid this that laws are enacted, and means 
used to procure uniformity of construction, and application in a free country. 
This object is to produce certainty. The imperfection of the human judg-
ment produces uncertainty (542-543). 
Brackenridge supports the law in a time when the general public was 
hostile toward all laws and lawyers as infringing on individual pre-
rogatives. However, Brackenridge knows that the law is an effective 
reality-structuring device and that an established legal code prevents 
the catastrophes which can occur when realities fail to mesh: 
But difference of opinion produces ill will. A man and a wife will separate 
on a disagreement which has taken place about fixing the hencoop, or laying 
out a bed of parsley. Christians have burnt each other because one would 
say off, and the other from, and what man of sense doubts, but the burner, 
and burn'd, were equally good men. The creeds, confessions and commen-
taries of the one were just as orthodox as the other, but not precisely the 
same; and the nearer they come together the more wrath. This ought to teach 
in politics, at least, concession andforbearance (544). 
In addition, Brackenridge insists that the new nation can refine its 
legal system by studying past codes: 
BRACKENRIDGE'S MODERN CHIVALRY 255 
Romulus made regulations; Numa institutions; the plebiscita, or resolu-
tions of the tribunes, and the commons; Senatus consulta;judicia pretoris; 
responsa prudentum; these continued in the twelve tables, institutes, 
pandects, and commentaries, are grounds of that law, which on the decline 
and fall of the empire, was incorporated by the barbarous nations on their 
codes, as they became civilized, and an agricultural, and commercial people. 
It is the experience and wisdom of ages which alone can provide for the 
cases of difference in matters of claim, or right amongst a people (565). 
Just as the creative efforts of the poet or the painter shape primordial 
energy giving rise to the tradition of artist as maker, legal and educa-
tional systems channel this undifferentiated energy in order to make 
civilization possible; thus, Brackenridge subscribes to the classical 
conviction that institutions enable men to be human. Denying the 
Rousseauian doctrine of spontaneity which asserts that institutions 
are repressive and hostile to man's true nature, Brackenridge insists 
that the "spontaneous overflow of emotions" is not self-expression 
but destructive mobism and that political and educational institutions 
convert primitive energy into culture. Brackenridge is a conscious 
mythmaker: he knows that a "self" can exist only in civilization and 
that all legal and moral codes such as Christianity are designed for 
this purpose; "All the rules of morality are but maxims of prudence. 
They all lead to self-preservation" (618). Like the Scottish moralists 
Adam Smith, David Hume, Adam Ferguson, Thomas Reed, Francis 
Hutcheson, Dugald Steward, Lord Kames, and Lord Monboddo and 
their disciple John Witherspoon who taught Brackenridge philosophy 
at Princeton, Brackenridge knows that all systems of morality, 
religious or ethical, are hedges against chaos and represent an effort 
to preserve human culture: "For the Christian religion is a system of 
humanity, and truth; and the great object of it is to secure morality 
amongst men. It has no metaphysics in the nature of it; but is intelli-
gible to a child, though catechisms are not" (719). Like his mentor 
John Witherspoon who taught his Princeton students the democratic 
virtues through a series of lectures on contracts, oaths and vows, 
property rights, the constitution, and voting qualifications, Bracken-
ridge hopes that his narration of the adventures of the philosopher 
and the profiteer as well as his digressions on the nature of democracy 
will help the general public to internalize democratic virtues. Bracken-
ridge hopes that Modern Chivalry will create a common mentality 
based on democratic values; in his effort to socialize the Toms, Dicks, 
and Harrys of the new nation by making democratic values under-
standable to them (416), he not only draws on the wisdom of past 
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traditions as evidenced by the numerous classical allusions, he uses 
experience of the common expressed in diction that will appeal to 
the masses, as the following passage reveals: "I exclude attornies 
that are mere money gatherers; or professional men, that screw the 
needy, and grind the faces of the poor. Such there will always be. But 
nature presents nothing without an allay of evil" (436). Thus Bracken-
ridge hopes to reach the man in the street as well as the educated elite, 
and his purpose is reflected in the mixture of learned and colloquial 
passages in the novel: "This book is written for individuals of all 
attainments, and of all grades of intellects" (584). At the same time, 
he hopes that Modern Chivalry will preserve the cultural heritage of 
the new democracy: "It is an opus magnum, which comprehends law, 
physic, and divinity. Were all the books in the world lost, this alone 
would preserve a germ of every art. Music, painting, poetry, etc. 
Statuary it says the least about. Nevertheless, some hints are given that 
will serve to transmit the reputation of Phidias and Praxiteles; and 
stimulate the efforts of the chisel upon stone, in generations yet to 
come" (727). 
Although Brackenridge knows that "there is no perfection in any 
human institution" (497) and therefore refuses to subscribe to popular 
utopian theories of exponential growth in man's capacity to solve his 
problems, "Time and chance happeneth to all men" (496), he insists 
that reason and moderation enable man to resist his destructive 
potential and to realize his creative capacity. In spite of the fact that 
he maintains that the institutions of law, education, and art will 
enable men to be more fully human by establishing agreed-upon 
reality, he respects the necessity of the independent thinker in the new 
democracy to explore his subjective reality as an adaptive response to 
a society which denies his worth. Thus, Modern Chivalry chronicles 
the private vision of the artist as well as narrating the adventures of the 
rogue and the rational man. IS 
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15 See Ronald Paulson in his "Prefatory Note" in Eighteenth-Century Studies, 3 (Fall 
1969), 1-3. Paulson underscores the importance of understanding the eighteenth-century 
imagination and suggests that a new methodology for eighteenth-century studies needs to 
be developed. Chiding critics for slighting "the personal and deeply distinctive voice which 
lies somewhere between the Freudian unconscious and the direct communication and 
mingling with an audience," he states that 
it is time to penetrate the screen of public and commonly shared assumptions with the audience, get at the 
imagination, the sensibility that structures the poems, and find what is unique, even idiosyncratic, in the poet, 
and what is merely determined by the recalcitrance of materials, convention, or the public mode itself. 
